
















Copyright i\° 


COPYRIGHT DJkPOiia'. 

























r 





















\ 


X 








OF SANCTION 


JTtMHHIMIHMUHIIHHUMH 


♦J# wmmmuiHtwmtu 





A5JL. 

1^3 


OF SANCTION. 











OF SANG TIO N 


By 

GARRETT BAXTER 

» l 

Author of “Education” 
“Baxter’s Economics” 
“Social Constitution” 


PUBLISHED BY 
THE ECONOMIC PRESS 
Id 2 3 


Copyright, 1923, by 
Garrett Baxter. 



JUl-3 73, 







< 


t 


« A 
€ l i 


©C1A752029 


CONTENTS. 


<X 
h 

Chapter i 

The Criteria of Sanction. 
Chapter ii 

Of Approval and Disapproval. 
Chapter iii 

Of the Noble and the Ignoble. 
Chapter iv 

Of the Wise and the Unwise. 
Chapter v 

Of Morality and Immorality. 
Chapter vi 

Of Good and Evil. 

Chapter vii 

Of the True and the False. 
Chapter viii 

Of Praise and Blame. 

Chapter ix 

Of Pleasure and Pain. 
Chapter x 

Of Positive Sanction. 

Chapter xi 

Methods of Sanction. 

Chapter xii 

Of i he Altruistic. 

Chapter xiii 

Of The Egoistic. 

Chapter xiv 

Of Perfectionism. 





f 




CHAPTER I. 


THE CRITERIA OF SANCTION. 

The mountain, the valley, and the stream, 
afford majestic views of varied nature; and it 
may be said that human conduct also affords 
a tint and hue of varied nature. Nature, 
varies human conduct. The noble and the 
ignoble; the wise and the unwise; the moral 
and the immoral, are varient names for varient 
forms of human action. But in the society 
of men there are elements which encouage 
and promote a uniformity and harmony of 
conduct. So far as human action is con¬ 
cerned tiie society of men tends toward the 
likeness of conduct; and any actions contrary 
to the standards of conduct thus established 


2 


THE CRITERIA OF SANCTION. 


are discouraged by various means of approval 
and disapproval. 

So with a general consensus of conduct, or 
a standard of human activity, there exists a 
universal criteria, establishing what is certain 
and invariable as to what is noble and ignoble; 
what is wise and unwise; what is moral and 
immoral. Here is the basis of expectation, .of 
hope, of character, of praise and blame, of the 
conscience that means remorse, or pleasure or 
pain. Good and evil may possess variable 
qualities because of variable conditions, but 
whatever is regarded as good, as noble, as wise, 
must be considered as the test of honor and 
the measure of character. 

Such is the basis of ethical conduct. Men 
live in society; and if they shall perceive what 
actions are ethical and will obedience to them, 
they must know what is regarded as ethical 
and inethical as a basis of consideration. 
This is the ethical. If men shall win respect, and 
the esteem, of their fellows, some means of meas- 


thi: cmTDHiA of sanction. 


3 


uring the honorable must exist. What is hon- 
crubie or disnonorabie, good or evii, could not 
be wi ll ascertained without some standard ot 
conduct. 

but some countries esteem those actions 
honoiabie that me lvgaidcd m oilier countrieo 
as dishonorable, i he one wni Ijoa upon loo 
Mnicd and vile With mole complacency than 
the other; arid the ioimer wiii encourage iiie 
good and the noble rnoie than the* iai ei. 
i he test of this variation is onv- gennat icn- 
aency of modern nations to oiiow like 
standards of human conduct. What is nob.e 
or ignobie, wise or unwise, moral or immoral, 
is considerably reduced in variaton. There is 
now very much less variation than in atutent 
ages, in the noble of ancient times, we find 
sanction lent to the murderers of a great 
orator, while in our age* the same standard of 
intelligence would condemn such a course, 
in the wise of ancient times may be mention¬ 
ed what is now deemed unwise- the ancient 


\ 


THE CKITE1UA OF SANCTION. 


activities that employed any means to gain 
an end. As for morality, it is sufficient to 
mention the activities of the Romans during 
the last days of the republic to say whether 
our own age considers them as immoral. 

Brutality, force, deceit, dissimulation, vice 
and crime, we may have; but we neither 
adore them as arts nor exalt them in applause 


CHAPTER II. 


OF APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 

In a well conditioned society men arc very 
sensitive of what is right and wrong. They 
readily perceive what is right or wrong, and 
endeavor to avoid the one and pursue the other. 
The pursuit of right, indeed, is a very natural 
thing. It finds the easy sanction of approval 
and praise. 

The love of praise from honorable sources 
is a charming trait of conscientious men. Ifc is 
the source of honor- the reward not of mere 
circumstances or condition but of what is the 
noble in human conduct. If men are praised for 
worthy actions one of the most fertile means 
of promoting noble activity prevails. 


6' 


OF APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 


Laying aside flattery and dignity and rank; 
what activity may be considered as worthy of 
praise and blame 4 ? The character of a well 
ordered community disseminates the general 
nature of conduct. This being the case, little 
difficulty ought be experienced in the deter¬ 
mination of what is the right and the wrong 
course to pursue under given circumstancs. 
But for sake of clear understanding, an illus¬ 
tration under each form, the noble and the 
ignoble, th a wise and the unwise, the moral 
and the immoral, is presented: 

Two friends ran for public office at the same 
time. Toth were given nearly the same num¬ 
ber of vvt s. In the administration of their 
respective duties, one conducted his affairs in 
a manner becoming the dignity of public office. 
The* other, a d’ligent and industrious man, 
divided his public duties with private affairs. 
He accepted the offer of a private office that 
sought benefits from this particular public office. 
He divided his time; and when the two duties 


OF APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 7 

came in conflict, the interests of the company 
were always given priority. 

When the terms of office were about to expire, 
botii stood for reelection. But he who had so 
well proclaimed his interest in the public, but 
had taKeii particular pains to always g.vc other 



sufficient number of votes to return him to 
office, while he who had taken the interests of 
the people with him was not stoned but given a 
far greater number of votes than on his previous 
election. 

The defeated canidate displayed a great devo¬ 
tion to his clients. And the successful candi¬ 
date exhibited exceptional devotion to the inter¬ 
ests of the people. He made them healthier 
wealthier and happier. Another election came. 
This time it was to choose candidates for a much 
higher office. The two friends were struggling 
for the same post. The one became a senator: 
the other was hurled back to his private post, 
with the number of votes that corresponded 


8 


OF APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 


with the number of those on the regular pay 
role of the client. 

One spring morning a young woman strolled 
along the path of a beautiful park. As she 
approached an elevation the sun was climbing 
over the eastern hills. Looking out into the 
distance, the golden hues of the rising sun lit 
the horizen. A young man unexpectedly 
stood beside her. “I am bound for the golden 
east," he warmly exclaimed; and in the next 
minute he was rushing for the gold that pro¬ 
fusely lined the eastern skies, with arms out¬ 
stretched as if expecting every minute to heap 
them with gold. 

The maiden, descending the elevation, con¬ 
tinued along a sylvan pathway. Approaching an 
open space a mortcr car came rushing along just 
as an elderly lady was crossing the street. By 
the exercise of a high degree of skill, the young 
woman saved a venerable landmark of the • 
community. The heroic act was heralded all 
around; and as she leisurely walked along 


OF APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 


9 


flowers were strewn in hep path. Entering a 
pavilion, young women crowned her with a 
wreath of daisies. When she entered the home 
of a friend, a golden vase was presented to her 
amidst a very delightful formality. 

The young man hastened forward in* eager 
quest of his eastern gold. In his overanxietv 
he ran over a child and crippled it for life. 
Pushing forward, he encountered a severe storm. 
Lightning and thunder poured down upon him 
like spears from the bow of an angered god. 
He soon became entangled in the meshes of a 
ragged and rugged road. So slow and difficult 
was his progress, he had no more than reached 
the summit of a hill when the last rays of the 
setting sun were fading in the western horizen. 
He slood there looking out into the vast be¬ 
yond. No habitation greeted him. He was 
encircled by the awlul gloom of inky darkness 
and frightful silence. 

Two promising and worthy young men were 
sent on a mission of trust and importance. 


10 


OF APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 


They were duly presented to the proper official, 
and being a mission of some consequence, were 
requested to return the following day. In the 
mean time they became acquainted with two 
strangers, who, in turn, made them acquainted 
with two chaiming female fiiends of theirs. 
These young women were all attention; so 
much so, indeed, as to upset the equilibrium 
of one of the young men. In consequence, 
when the time came for both of them to return 
only one of the young men put in appearance. 
Two weeks thereafter the one who failed to 
appear was found surrendering to encircling 
forms of vice. He who maintained his mission, 
succeeded in his duties, won favor with his 
principals, and soon became a prominent man. 
Fhe other never rose above the recognition 
of servile creatures. 

The interest, good sense, and reason of men, 
in a well conditioned society, ought to make 
out a superior order of sanction reducing 
variation, deviation, or those interests that 


OF APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 


11 


run in so many directions as often clash in 
conflict. While there are objects of great variety 
and beauty, drawing men in many directions, 
there should be a rational sanction for human 
actions lest men be drawn into a vortex of 
error and pleasure that drowns them in pain. 


CHAPTER III. 


OF THE NOBLE AND THE IGNOBLE. 

Activities of great variety move from the 
relations of men in troops of armored ambition. 
But they should go forth in the measured 
strain of social sanction. Were the egoisms of 
social man without the"sanction of countervail¬ 
ing sentiment, habits must become so arbitrary 
as to destroy all sense of right and wrong. 

If the wrong is to prevail; what need of the 
sanction of right. If the ignoble is to prevail; 
what need of the noble. If the dishonorable 
is to hold sway as the standard of conduct, 
what need of the honorable. If men combine 
in themselves the whole consideration of self they 
create themselves little bombs that tend to go 


OF THE NOBnE AND THE IGNOBLE. 


13 


off into an explosion when they come into 
contact with each other. Caesar cannot live 
in the same land with Pompey. 

But there is a noble and beautiful element in 
the society of modern men which we call 
sanction because it means the approval of the 
honorable in conduct, and discourages the dis¬ 
honorable. With this valuable element always 
active amongst men no one is always in dis¬ 
regard of others because no one is the ex¬ 
clusive judge of his own conduct. Such men 
recognize the habits and approval of conduct by 
others. They reocgnize the great value of acting 
in accord with the general trend of activity 
maintained in the community, and to do that 
which tends to elevate and harmonize them. 
Hence the right over the wrong. Hence, too, 
the noble over the ignoble, and the honorable 
over the dishonorable. 

What is more beneficial to the state than 
right conduct; it leads to least irregularity. 
What more resourceful than the noble; it leads 


I 


14 OF THE NOBLE AND THE IGNOBLE. 

to many sacrifices wherein some of the finest 
qualities of human conduct are displayed. 
It leads men 10 look upon wrong with utmost 
disgust. It condemns bribery, conspiracy and 
t reason. It stamps as unworthy and dishonorable 
actions that run contrary to the general trend of 
the community. It would certainly be a very 
difficult tiling to record anything more worthy 
of the praise of men than the action of that 
general who spurned the offer of his foe‘s 
subordinate to betray his cause to him. 

The noble qualities of honorable actions are 
characteristic of a republic; they advance its 
cause and lift it out of the dangers that tend 
to create disorders and treason. Sanction, in a 
republic, acts the same as force in a monarchy, 
only the former is far more effective. Who 
wins much approval from ones fellows when the 
whole human element is quenched and absorb¬ 
ed in a centralized system of human rule. A 
republic is government by the people; and they 
govern themselves best when voluntary sane- 


15 


OF THE NOBEE AND THE IGNOBLE. 


tion takes the place of many laws. In the form 
of this sanction many activities of right a ad 
to less wrong and a great respect for law. in 
this sanction men endeavor to do waat is right 
because that course rusmts in respect from 
others. With the respect of others men find 
it easy to earn praise; and desiring this worthy 
consideration of men, exalting and ennobling id¬ 
eals enkindle an enthusiasm and ambition for 
honorable actions that never would be aroused. 
The noble and the honorable exists in most 
societies but its most fertile ground is a 


republic. 

What element can be more potent for right 
conduct than the sanction of approval. The 
influence of sacred elements appear strong 
against the activity of the wrong, but the 
influence of the noble, in honorable conduct, 
is certainly valuable and considerable. It leads 
men to realize that the human element is one 
of the most excellent of things, something to 
be venerated and respected. 


16 


OF TIIE NOBEE AND THE IGNOBLE. 


Was it noble or ignoble when one, who had 
an important duty to perform, brought a charge 
against another for offering him a bribe to 
desist; for was it not placing duty to others 
above considerations of self. Was it noble or 
ignoble when Ephi'altes, thinking with his tow¬ 
ering thoughts of wealth and its pkasurts, 
sold the lives of three hundred great souls, 
lighting for their country at the pass of Tiler- 
mopylaae, against the hordes of the near East 
And which is the greater deed; that wherein 
a woman could not be made, by any severities 
of torture, to divulge the name of a single 
conspirator of those wiio had sworn to destroy 
trie power of Grecian tyrants, or the atrocious 
deceit that aided the destable Sylla to gain 

admission into his native city, not that he 

• 

may lay a wreath on the memory of those who 
had fallen that lie may win but for the horrible 
purpose of destroying the inhabitants. 

Was it noble or ignoble for those men, who 
did not know the fate that awaited them, to 


OF THE NOBLE AND THE IGNOBLE. 


17 


place themselves at the disposal ol Edward III 
who had won the siege of Calais, or, when 
some of the inhabitants of Athens, becoming 
weary of the siege by Sylla, was it noble or 
ignoble for them to so discourse as to impart 
information to rhe enemy of a week section ol 
the protecting wall. 

What is noble or ignoble is action of the 
wisest quality, for it is action springing from 
the desires of men to engage worthy means 
to worthy ends and to lay aside considerations 
of absolute self and serve so that others may 
be served and approve their actions. 


CHAPTER IV. 


OF THE WISE AND THE UNWISE. 

There may be wrong; but no wrong may ever 
be noble. Neither may it be moral. If it is 
immoral it can never be wise. The differ, 
ence between the noble and the ignoble is a 
difference of the wise and the unwise; and 
that which is immoral can not be wise because it 
can not be right. The right means to right 
actions can not mean the ignoble. There can 
be no such thing as wrong means to honorable 
actions. If the end is the honorable in action 
the means cannot be false and improper. 

The wrong course will lead in the wrong 
direction. It most always leads to nowhere. 


19 


OF THE WISE AND THE UNWISE. 

The true road to wealth is paved all the way 
with the acceptable element right conduct; with 
actions that are sanctioned by moral men. 
Wrong and force are as far from right as folly 
and fickleness. 

Is it a wise use of means- to gain the end of 
pleasure only. If it is, that pleasure can not 
be very enduring. If the end is merely to 
possess large powder as a means of pleasure 
only, the mere fact of pleasure will create more 
censure than praise, for w r ise and intelligent men 
do not usually sanction pleasure as an end. 
Tnee is not much pleasure in censure. 

If there is some of the wise and much of 
tiie wrong there is likely to exist a great deal 
in the form of voluntary sanction. But if there 
is more of the w r rong than the right there is 
more of the unwise than the wise. The wise 
always goes in the right direction; and if men 
are pursuing the wrong course they will often 
look to what is wise, either in the form of 
wise counsel or forms of wise construction, 


20 


OF THE WISE AND THE UNWISE. 


to guide them wisely and properly. The wise 

s' 

has vision, and intuitively or deductively, 
effect not only proper means to proper ends, 
hut also radiate an influence that effects very 
great results. It lends itself to the future and 
counsels the present though the latter be so 
thoroughly aborbed in itself as to scarcely heed 
its wiser and greater judgments and admoni¬ 
tions. But its voice rings over the centuries 
and often effects wonderful transformations. 
The brutalities of war, unwisely stimulated 
by Homer, are greatly reduced; the character of 
recreation and pleasure, unwisely debased by 
the followers of Epicurus and Bacchus, is dis¬ 
tinctly improved; the virtue that admitted of 
liittle thought of what is made a reference to 
approval and ciiapproval, looks now to the 
nobility of sanction. 

If the actions of men shall be wise they 
must be sanctionable. To make them sanction- 
able they must be right. 

The elements that stimulate the right and 


OF THE WISE AND THE UNWISE. 21 

the honorable may consist of excellent books. 
There are many fine books that lift the mind 
many degrees above the level oi ordinary activ¬ 
ity. Books of this kind are of great moral- 
worth. They strengthen the will and promote 
the qualities of conduct that result in esteem, 
they stimulate men to the emulation of noble 
and worthy actions. They lead not merely to 
right conduct but to what is honorable, and 
not only to wdiat is honorable but to what is 
noble; and what is noble is to an extent 
measured by the example. 

While the right may not be noble in every 
case yet with the example of noble deeds before 
them, men who are satisfied with merely doing 
what is right, are influenced to go further and 
do what includes both the right and the hon¬ 
orable; and, if the circumstances admit, to 
include lire right, the honorable and the noble, 
l'iie example and the reputation of disinguished 
men lead and influence men to high and nob.e 


actions. 


22 


OF THE WISE AND THE UNWISE. 


It goes without saying that as the influence 
of the noble increase, the influence of the 
ignoble decrease, and that as the influence of the 
ignoble decrease the influence of the noble 
increase. There is loss and gain on either side. 
If the noble shall prevail over the ignoble, 
the example should not be merely of right, 
but of the noble, because higher, m >re exem¬ 
plary and more effective as an influence over 
the wrong and the ignoble. But the false 
example advanced, in prejudice and selfishness, 
to offset the va’ued influence of the honorable, 
should always be discouraged. 

That will be regarded as wise which is made 
to refer to actions that are considered by the 
community as honorable. Taking the purpose 
and the end to refer to the condut of men as 
measured by general approval and disapproval, 
by the sanction of the present and the past, 
and particularly of the sanction that has with¬ 
stood the test of foes and wars and parties, and 
(merged with greater lustre and power, the 
the m'arts can never be false, at least for any 


OF THE WISE AND THE UNWISE. 


0*3 

r > 


appreciable length of time. 

For the right is like a God; noble everywhere 
at all times, and summon men of all ages and all 
climes, through the mists of the false, over 
the cliffs and the billows of the inappropriate, 
to the firm and enduring rock of wisdom. The 
wise and the unwise are like buildings upon the 
foundation of stone and the foundation of sand. 
The one supports a great structure, a solid 
and fiijrn society, possessing many complexities, 
many different departments, many outlines 
of activity, yet all, with very few exceptions, 
effecting a symmetrical means to a symmetrical 
end. The foundation in sand not only is 
unwise as means, for it can answer no good 
purpose, but it exhibits the unwise in the end 
proposed, something that is no good at all. If 
society shall be wisdom it must be able to 
withstand the elements of the unwise, the im¬ 
proper, the immoral. 



CHAPTER V. 


OF MORALITY AND IMMORALITY. 


In proportion as they are consistent in them¬ 
selves, individuals find their conduct sanctioned, 
in proportion as they are inconsistent in 
themselves they find their actions are not 
sanctioned. If one is true to himself he is true 
to ali around him. He is not less true to himself 
than to others because he does not pervert 
his natural being; and he always please other s 
because he does not always act with reference to 
his own exclusive concern. But he that en¬ 
deavors to follow an honorable course merely 
to attain a vicious end is unwise enough to 
exhibit the motive in the vicious character of 
effects; he that takes a wrong course to a right 


OF MORALITY AND IMMORALITY. 


25 


end is far more sanctionable. 

An act of the individual may be of no con¬ 
sequence to any one, but if the same act is 
repeated, it may prove of consequence to some 
one else besides the actor. It may be an act 
which begins a habit that affects one or two 
others. If the act is still repeated, it may 
prove of consequence to most every person 
with whom xhe individual comes into relations. 
The act may be a habit that becomes fixed, 
and establish an expectation for ail future ac¬ 
tivities and relations. 

If wrong habits exist, the circle of sanction 
isnecssarily limited because men of moral habits 
do not sanction the immoral. If acts of right 
quality are advanced for right purposes, they 
will usually be regarded as moral by the opinion 
of honorable men. That will generally be re¬ 
garded as moral, then, which is generally 
so regarded by the sanction of the society. 
The scope of sanction is widened. Those 
actions are regarded as proper and as truly 


26 


OF MORALITY AND IMMORALITY. 


moral, therefore, which stand the test of 
numbers and time. 

It requires more time for the good to prevail 
in a community that measures activity by the 
standard of selfishness than in a community that 
measures it by the standard of approval; but 
when actions become habit that is worn into 
benefits the}' will be regarded as good even by 
selfish men. But this good is likely to be re¬ 
garded as evil by most unselfish and moral 
men. Generally speaking, those actions will 
be regaded by most men as good which affect 
m >st men well, in repetition over length of 
time, while those which can not affect many 
well and affect many wrongly, must be decreed 
evil. Many persons, in all ages, admire virtue. 
Mere persons, in some ages than others, regard 
it with more respect than hedonism. When 
virtue is more extensively regarded than hedon¬ 
ism the community excels in many of the activ¬ 
ities of the society. When it lends more sanc¬ 
tion to hedonism than to virtue, the society is 


OF MORALITY AND IMMORALITY. 


most likely given to very little approval 
of morality. While virtue does not think less of 
self than of others, hedonism thinks largely of 
self and how the means of pleasure may 
possibly be advanced. Virtue seeks character 
and hedonism seeks satiation. As virtue seeks 
character it may attain a very high degree of 
of morality; for it is a part of virtue that what 
is done' in others praise is done wisely, and is 

r 

honored as a worthy and noble act. Hedonism 
may be approved, but virtue is always appro¬ 
ved and often honored and exalted sometimes 
even by hedonism. 

The approval which arraigns the right against 
the wrong is the approval of conscience- the 
sense of blame for the wrong and praise for the 
right in the conduct of life. If one follows a 
a certain course of conduct, that course may 
have no reference to the approving influence 
of any sanction. It may be a course according 
to ones own notion of conduct, and wholly 
regardless of the approval or blame of others. 
The sanction of conduct is ignored, and the 


28 


OF MORALITY AND IMMORALITY. 


sense of wrong, the fear of blame, so essntial 
to a healthy and a harmonious social sanction, 
is a closed consideration. There is no moral 
tongue against this immoral victim. He is buried 
in the palace of wickedness. But such actions 
are heavy breeders of evil; and if there is no 
conscience to awaken against it men of moral 
sense must come to feel a narrow circle of 
influence. To maintain a healthy condition of 
conscience men who endeavor to maintain a 
healthy moral sense, to keep conscience fully 
alive, endeavor to create moral conscience by 
pointing out how far the line of conduct pur¬ 
sued is out of harmony and usual acceptation 
with the sense of right and wrong prevailing- 
in the community. The vigor of right arouse 
a moral sense that weakens wrong; and just in 
proportion as the vigor is maintained in that 
proportion the conscience is aroused and the 
wrong is weakened. 

And that fine temple of the man, character, 
is the structure reared of the habits which 


OF MORALITY AND IMMORALITY. 


29 


men approve as prudent and wise. They are 
the habits making a good or a bad reputation, 
just as the actions iiave been regarded as 
chastity, sobriety, truthfulness, candor justice; 
for these, amongst others, are the enduring 
precious stones entering into the solid and 
lasting structure, good character,- a structure 
wnich every one knows and all admire. 

Those activity o: men, which tend to 
facilitate and promote the relations of society', 
must be wise and moral or they would not pro¬ 
mote trust, good faith, and liberty, the very 
great elements of relational expectation. 

So the quality of conduct prescribed for the 
individuals of a community is the conduct 
produced by the sanction of the community, 
that which affects men in their habits, in 
tneir customs, and in the virility and in the 
capacity of social relations, it is conduct of 
human relations, consistent with the principles 
and precedents of conduct deemed moral and 
wise, because it promotes the expectation and 


30 


OF MORALITY AND IMMORALITY. 


confidence of all. Nothing is so uncertain and 
treacherous as immorality; nothing so destruc¬ 
tive of the society of men. 

It is therefore impossible to say that the 
actions of men are good when their nature 
reveals an intent or capacity to injure. If the 
action is manifested in further conduct, result- 
ting in actions of customs, we may say that 
they are beyond doubt very injurious or wrong. 
Actions out of line with the standard of habits 
maintained by a community, are tinted or tan¬ 
gled with what is deemed immoral. They are 
immoral because they contravene the prevailing 
ideas of habits maintained and the expeeta- 
tions arising from them. 

In this line of action we find what is mostly 
in blame,- abuse, slander, id manners, the 
sensual, selfishness, vanity. There is a whole 
muster of what is out of harmony with the 
sympathetic pulse of the community, what is 
the oppsite of its heart throb and affections. 

If habits are limited to wrong they are deemed 


OF MORALITY AND IMMORALITY. 


31 


vicious because they are manifested in oppsition 
to what is the general approval of the commu¬ 
nity. As an act of the individual, conduct is 
right or wrong just as it runs smooth, or runs 
against the manifestations of right and wrong. 
Conduct bearing along the line of what is man¬ 
ifested as general approval is right because it is 
regarded as moral, and conduct to the contrary 
is wrong. It is not wrong particular^ because 
it is not sanctioned but particularly because it 
is in direct conflict with what is,- vice against 
virtue, wrong against right, immorality against 
morality. Sanction approves of what is moral 
and thus maintain what it regards as right. 
But it does not stop there because the contrary 
of approval is disapproval. The disapproval of 
what is not approved is simply establishing and 
marking what is really sanctioned. 

So it is enough to say that the term moral 
applies to a greater field of human conduct 
than the immoral, because it is a standard 
measuring the contrary. This must be true 


Z2 OF MORALITY AND IMMORALITY. 

for if it is not, the proposition must he main¬ 
tained that the conduct of the few is the con¬ 
duct of the community. 

Whatever the conduct of most of the people 
of a societ}", that conduct establish the char¬ 
acter of the society. If the society is strong, 
healthy and happy, it may be more moral than 
immoral, aad if it reveals what is considered 
by most societies and most ages as honorable, 
it is’a truly moral society. It would certainly be 
a difficult thing to say that in this community 
there exists extremes, that excess in anything 
results in more pain than pleasure and that this 
• s the causee of mor evil than good. 


CHAPTER VI. 

OF GOOD AND E^IL. 

Good comprehends much more than the 
moral. It includes the moral, the wise, the 
noble. It does not stop with these elements 
of sanction, for it goes further still and includes 

more. 

Corresponding with morality, good refers to 
conduct that crystallize approved habits, and 
evil as conduct invaiiably regaded as injurious. 

Good, synonymous with the w T ise, indicates 
prudence and appropriate judgment in conduct. 
Evil, in this respect, means the effects of impru¬ 
dence. 

Regarded with reference to the noble, good 
refers to unselfish activity for the benefit of 


34 


OF GOOD AND EVIL. 


others, and evil the nse of apparently beneficial 
conduct for gaining personal benefits which 
could not otherwise be gained. 

But the term good specifies another element 
of sanction which is so far without notice,- the 
beautiful element called humanity. 

When Rome was supreme a human being 
perished that evil might surrender to the 
conquering direction of good, and since then all 
the elements of sanction are influenced by this 
one source of approval and disapproval. 

When Rome enjoyed its brutal sports a man of 
humane spirit placed himself into the fury of con¬ 
test waged by gladiators in the Roman Cohsum; 
he lost his life but he gained his object, that 
the destruction of human life, to afford passing 
amusement to people, should cease. The act 
of the individual found its final sanction, and 
the inhuman practice discontinued as an evil. 
Evils, inhuman in character, have subsided, and 
ages have produced those worthy men who have 
lent their hands to the great good office of 
mercy; a wonderful element of modern sanction. 


OF GOOD AND EVIL. 


35 


This being the case what spirit of conduct 
may be expected in modern communities? 
Is it too much to expect that in the relations 
of man to man the warm spirit of humanity 
shall take the place of the cold spirit of inhu¬ 
manity. When humanity has the sanction of 
the good; is the contrary an evil? 

What element of sanction amongst men may 
be regarded as most consistent in this respect. 
Should the comfort of each and all be the 
standard of sanction, or should this rule be 
discarded, and that of the bare existence of 
the many and luxury for the few be the rule? 
If the latter is the rule, is not the rule of sanc¬ 
tion the same as evil precedents. 

What spirit of conduct may find sanction in 
welfare; that which affects practically all as each 
or that which affect all through a few? Is it 
a rational supposition to say that people will 
approve that course which leads to dispro¬ 
portions in the consideration of good and evil? 

Those two great principles of human action 


36 


OF GOOD AND EVIL. 


termed egoism and altruism, are but differ¬ 
ent lines of activity approved or disapproved as 
principles of social conduct. The one, accep¬ 
ted by a community, as the best means of 
happiness, looks to the direction of the egokt 
for the means to an end. Whether this ought 
to be a standard of sanction may best be judg¬ 
ed by what is. The altruistic, is in line with 
the spirit of humanity; it spreads its influence 
inrough all and not through a few. As a mat¬ 
ter or fact, the egoistic means self first, while 
the altruistic means the proper consideration 
oi others. Absolute self is egoism, and it is 
the same as when Crassus marched to his 
doom under the noble form of patriotism, the 
wise and the noble. 

It may be a difficult thing to say how these 
two principles may thrive in the same society. 
They are very dilierent in character. Where 
one is the other must be an evil. But is the 
altruistic an evil? iNot in its true meaning, 
it is evil only when used as an egoistic vanguard 


OF GOOD AND EVIL. 


07 
0 4 

We may say, in general, that positive wrong 
consist of erroneous actions, either without 
intentions of affecting others, as when it is 
the consequence of some mistaken notion, or 
when it is unduly repeated, with tuli conscious¬ 
ness of the evil being done. The individual 
who knows what is moral but insist upon doing 
what is regarded as immoral, must be regarded 
by honorable men as evil. He wouid be re¬ 
garded as evil if the conduct is pursued over 
valid objections even though the act be in 
partial keeping with the moral sanction of the 
community. 

The right is action in accordance with general 
approval. We recognize it in the sanctions of 
negation and of approval. We recognize it in the 
habits and customs, the rules and precedent. 1 , 
existing in the relations of men, which conserve 
and promote them. We also recognize it in the 
attentions shown to those who perform some 
act or pursues some course that elevates and 
dignifies the good. 


OF GOOD AND EVIL. 


3 


8 


What, indeed, makes any one more popular 
and respected than another unless a course of 
conduct that makes a person reach more than 
others in his course of actions. That conduct is 
different in kind and quality and often sets a 
very desirable example. Such actions extend far 
and wide in the influence of the excellent good, 
if not stayed by the hands of the adverse in the 
selfish. It is conduct that may be very easily 
imitated; and it is usually followed in normal 
communities. 

The right and the wrong, then, is a matter o p 
wills acting upon wills, resulting in the sanction 
of right oi wrong. The action is up for the 
approval or disapproval of the people of the 
interested society, and whether it is approved 
or disapproved is a matter of judgment passed 
by the interested members of the society. 

If the act affect only an individual, without 
affecting others, there is the exercise of j udg- 
ment and will only by the individual for the 
individual with referenee to the habits and 


OF GOOD AND EVIL. 


39 


customs usually approved or disapproved by 
the community. The act may be good or 
evil, laudable or reprehensible, but if it is an 
isolated act it is chiefly suject of the ineividuals 
own will. He may strive to carry it to perfec¬ 
tion because others admire and applaud such 
actions and their effects; or he may do his level 
best to suppress actions which the society con¬ 
demns. How well he succeeds in any direction 
depends upon how well he is trained in the 
standards of conduct maintained in the corn- 
community, and upon the individuals appli¬ 
cation and devotion to those standards. It 
depends upon the individuals own capacities 
to will for the good or against the evil. If 
the individual admires the conduct but is inca¬ 
pable of living up to it, his will is weaker than 
the wills of most of the members of society, 
but if he is in love with the community he 
should by no means be tumbled out a ten story 
window. There is a good foundation for others 
will. The good of a community ought to be 


40 


OF GOOD AND EVIL. 


good. Is it not good to spread good. It is 
certainly not good when good men do evil to 
do good. When that evil is done one evil man 
is left while one evil man is gone, and by the 
time all the evil is gone few will be left as good. 
Good ought to promote good over evil. If 
not the good is not verjr strong and a little evil 
is likely to pull it down to the level of the evil. 
When it does so the evidence lies in the num¬ 
bers held under the leshes of force and crime. 


CHAPTER VII. 


OF THE TRUE AND THE FAUSE. 

.It would be an exceedingly difficult matter 
f O doubt that ali the noble actions and con¬ 
ditions of life rest upon anything more endu¬ 
ring than the good. The most excellent of 
human virtues, constancy; is it not dependent 
upon the ethical element, good, for its very ex¬ 
istence? What may be said of trust since its 
foundation is the good; would it not end in the 
throes of disaster were its foundation evil? For 
it is certain that evil men possess little con¬ 
science, and little conscience will fail in trust. 
Napoleon, great in many things, lifted men to 
high positions, but he was not always fortunate 
in the selection of men for positions of trust. 


42 


OF THE TRUE AND THE FALSE. 


One of the most treacherous to his interests 
was the falsifying Talleyrand. He was false 
because he was evil; and he was evil because he 
was false: for what is more inconsistent with the 
true than the false; more misleading, more 
disrupting. It is the practice of a double char¬ 
acter, and a double character is no character at 
all. Would you trust when you think of this 
and it turns out that, turns out treachery for 
faith imposed in a human creature, turns out 
distrust for trust, evil for good. Who, indeed 
would regard with favor the representation that 
a certain condition produces certain effects, 
whereas the conditions are different and may 
actually iead to something entirely unexpected. 

The great tie that binds in human relations 
is friendship; but if good does not prevail in a 
society enduiing friendships are impossible. 
They are impossible because such excellent 
qualities are impossible in evil. Evil tires its 
decrepid votaries and cools the congenial spirit 
of humanity. Man then does not sincerely love 


OF THE TRUE AND THE FALSE. 


43 


man, no matter what may be the claim, or the 
point of the compass. The true is a necessary 
element of real friendship. Otherwise there is 
double deception where there should be double 
devotion not of favors and gifts, to take the 
place of human sympathies, but of virtues 
which cement men into kindred feelings and 
disposition. 

The false, in making statements of facts, 
wrecks more good than is necessary for a 
healthy condition of society. Some may have 
some interests to promote and some may have 
others, yet, unless the truth is stated respec¬ 
ting them, neither side will find consistent 
conditions of relations. Some may be good 
falsifiers and some bad truth tellers, but in 
the one case there is the fabrication of facts 
for the deliberate purpose of misleading to the 
injury of others, while in the other case there 
is the statement of truth for the express pur¬ 
pose of covering a false condition. The false is 
a dangerous thing in a normal community. 


44 


OF THE TRUE AND THE FALSE. 


While it may be possible to color evil so as to 
make it appear as good, still this coloring can¬ 
not possess a long period of existence because 
the coloring is tinged with strokes of inconsis¬ 
tent temper and habits. One can hardly bo 
expected to go east and west at the same 
time; and he cannot be both good and evil 
at the same time. An individual may be a 
lawyer and an author at the same time, and 
he may be a good or a bad one of either, 
but he cannot be a good and a bad lawyer 
at the same time. It is a distinct evil to lead 
one to suppse that one is something else than 
what he actually is. To make immorality 
appear as morality is much worse than making 
it appear exactly what it is. Under false color 
it is far more effective because without sufficient 
blame and censme It is far more insidious 
and makes heavy inroads upon the element of 
the good. 

And with reference to the wise, certainly 
the pretense of wisdom has lead to many dis- 


OF THE TRUE AND THE FALSE. 


45 


asters. One of the most notable instances of 
this kind is that of the wealthy Lydian, Croesus. 
He lost an army, and was saved from death by 
the magic name of Solon. The false of wisdom 
is caiamitous in the extreme; it presumes so 
much and achieves so little that it earns little 
in iaudtion and applause. 

As for the noble and the ignoble, it must be 
seif evident that many actions are without the 
support of true and lasting qualities. Personal 
ends, egoistic ambition, makes a difference in 
means to ends and a difference of the noble and 
the ignoble. They are the black spots in no¬ 
torious actions. 

In the sphere of ethical conduct, what is false 
is severely condemned; and it is severely con¬ 
demned because it hides from the renovating 
and invigorating influence of public policy and 
public sanction. If left to sweep through a 
community, its effect is like an invisible poison 
gas shot from an invisible source. 


CHAPTER VIII. 

OF PRAISE AND BLAME. 

If good seems a desirable thing the true seems 
not less so. Whether this standard be repre¬ 
sented by habits, by customs, by precepts or 
by principles, the one who runs contrary to the 
vein of approval maintained is sure to find 
ills conduct meeting with disapproval. If lie 
permits disapproved actions to continue, or if 
he goes into actions covering deceit in matters 
that are intrinsically good, he is sure to meet 
with blame. The mind of the good, keenly 
sensitive of the evil, is little disposed to praise 
the false It is properly blamed. What is vicious 
is blamed because what is good breeds opposi¬ 
tion to it. 


OF PRAISE AND BLAME. 


47 


The fact of it is that in rational society the 
decree of sanction proves what is desirable and 
what is undesirable in the actions of men. 
Therefore all which conforms with this conduct 
is in approval and consequently the proper and 
appropriate subject of approbation and of 
commendation, of laudation, and of applause. 
Sanction feels the nature and character of 
human volition and decides whether it is the 
subject of praise or of blame, and if it is of a 
quality meriting particular sympathies. The 
nature of the sanction depends upon the na¬ 
ture of the act; the conduct must, in some 
manner, be the subject of proper considera¬ 
tion, the appropriate reference of opinion to the 
conduct which is deemed useful and agreeable. 

In approbation there may be mentioned 
conduct that in neither insufficient or over- 
sufficient for the given time or occasion. It 
is the well proportioned actions of men that 
results in the greatest balance of devotion to 
matters private and public. 

As for self respect, no doubt that considera- 


48 


OF PiiAJSF AND BLAME. 


tions of personal virtue, polite manners, restraint 
of temper, must produce very attractive consid¬ 
eration from others. 

Commendation; is this not the praise of men 
since it recommends the valued qualities of faith¬ 
fulness in the statement of facts and the admin¬ 
istration of trusts? Would a good name be 
given of one who does violence to trust. “I trust 
you my friend”; and he breaks the trust that ends 
in censure. With every resource of reason, we 
regard as unresonable the ugly and the hurtful. 

it is difficult to say that those manifestations 
of approval, exhibited by assembled people, are 
b.stowcd upon those actions that are deemed 
vile and vulgar, and for this conspicuous reason, 
that public taste, unless demoralized by public 
agencies, is most always of the good. What 
moral man could descend so far as to corrupt 
good taste by applauding a scene of Boccaccio, 
a battle of human slaughter, or a speech on 
the virtues of treason? It is a worthy com¬ 
mendation that may be referred to the good 


OF PRAISE AND BLAME. 


49 


that it applauds what is worthy and honorable. 

And it would be a difficult thing to mention 
anything more excellent, beautiful and honor¬ 
able, than that custom of the ancient Athen¬ 
ians in which they acted so well in laudation 
of honorable and noble conduct. They would 
praise with orations, the ) 7 would approve and 
laud excellence in atheletics, and crown with 
gold acts of noble quality. They were a great 
people, because the human qualities of sanction 
were not smothered with inhumanity. 

Is praise not wisdom since it encourages the 
good and condemns the evil; for the contrary 
is nothing less than blame, not that there is 
no approval in silence but that what is evil is 
surely and certainly censured, which makes the 
presence of the noble a presence of exultation 
and the presence of the ignoble one of shame. 
And hence it is that we find the difference in 
good and evil to consist of the choice in man's 
approval and disapproval; for it must be observ¬ 
ed that intelligent persons admire the noble and 


50 


OF PRAISE AND BLAME. 


depraved ones the ignoble. 

So what may be blamed by intelligent men 
if not such conduct as means vice and avarice, 
brutality, deceit. Are these not the elements 
that invariably cause the displeasure of hon¬ 
orable men. For to what do they lead if not 
to dissatisfaction, to disorder, to disruption. 
Hence all which conforms to this is in sympa¬ 
thy with the false and the evil, and so it is 
regarded by ethical men as dishonorable. 

Those who regard with favor these elements 
of conduct consider the negative of general 
sanction as worthy of pursuit, while those who 
sanction what is regarded by most of the 
•members of the community as true and good 
condemn these actions and censure the actors. 
The variation gives rise to blame of one class 
by another and of praise, by that one, of its own 
standards. No one, who regards himself as true 
to the good, will praise vice and avarice. But 
vicious and avarictious men will praise their 
foiley and even blame good men for censuring 


OF PRAISE AND BLAME. 


51 


their incomprehensible course. 

Let us turn to the illustration given on the 
tenth page of this volume; who will say that 
any thing like censure, coming from the servile 
creatures indicated there, could make any head¬ 
way in the ranks of moral men, against the 
stoic standard maintained by that successful 
young gentleman. And who was right and 
who was wrong in the exercise of human 
wisdom, the young woman or the young man. 
Could any mortal man view the primary con¬ 
sideration of wealth, with its awful trail of 
evil, as the true subject of sanction, even 
though they be able to make out an atmos¬ 
phere of their own coloring? Is it not, O 
wisdom, much nobler, and much greater, that 
wealth follow the path of the wise and the 
honorable? It may be expected that in the 
other example given under the topic, approval 
and disapproval, that the friends of-* the de¬ 
feated candidate sounded the virtues of their 
choice to the harmony of “divine power”; but 


OF PRAISE AND BLAME. 


r i° 

imi 

when the foggy clouds of deceit roll away the 
clear vision of honor and nobleness looms to 
view as the sanction of the good. 

Egoism, self love, and the exaggeration of 
desires, could not be accepted other than in 
the artificial confines of artificfal conditions. 
If sc If satisfaction is the chief motive and end 
of action and thought, the inconsistencies of 
conduct with the prevailing standard of sanc¬ 
tion must be numerous and great. 

Let the censor of the greatest number pre¬ 
vail, and the greatest good will prevail, because 
that which is deemed evil will diminish and 
subside, while that which is deemed good will 
increase and be all the more true as the rep¬ 
resentative moral standard of the society. 

When the standard of the society is extended 
and advanced, then, of course, dissention and 
discord diminish. Actions are less covert and 
sinister; they are more in accord with the will 
of the society. 

What else may be considered so true when 


OF PRAISE AND BLAME. 


society recognizes the standard of conduct 
pursued in a commuity as the conduct that 
is worthy of praise and the morality that is 
usually praised. Men praise men because the 
action is looked upon as woi thy and vaiua k, 
what emulates and promotes the ideas and ideals 

of noble and honorable conduct. What is true 

\ 

and good^ what is noble and honorable, isappio- 
ved and praised; what is ignoble and dishonor¬ 
able is disapproved and blamed. 

The very necessity of this is observed in the 
nature of society; for it cannot be said that 
men could live in that condition, becoming the 
high qualities of human creatures, unless they 
live in harmony, and maintain that harmony 
by the approval of what is in accord with the 
general conduct of the community and disap¬ 
proval of what is not in accord with it; by the 
praise of what emulates, what is approved, and 
by blaming what tends to compromise and to 
degrade what is the standard of conduct usually 
maintained. 


54 


OF PRAISE AND BLAME. 


Praise, not too limited as to prove of no value 
at all, nor so promiscuous as to be of little con¬ 
sideration, must prove very effective in strength¬ 
ening the society and in making it firm and 
steady in the course of its existence. 


CHAPTER 


IX. 


of pleasure and pain. 

If there is anything that satisfies rational 
man it is the sense of being thought well cf : if 
there is anything that affords more lasting 
pleasure, it is the agreeable consideration ex¬ 
pressed by others in the form of praise. Our 
fellows are our neighbors, and >f our neighbour 
think well of us, because we are true to them, 
they will be sure to give us more than wealth; 
they wfll give us a good name. If we are un¬ 
true to them, they will censure us for being 
false; and if we disregard this censure, we must 
come to find ourselves experiencing many dis¬ 
comfitures. We may enjoy this, in a way, but if 
we have enjoyed the pleasures of respect and 


56 


OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 


esteem, we will encounter the withering spirit 
of pain. Conscience, yet alive, is full of con¬ 
scious activity. It bites like a serpent and 
stings with many tongues. 

Conscience is a very effective means of effec¬ 
ting good conduct. It will keep the white 
toga of honor untouched by dishonor, unstained 
by the vile activities of evil. Good conscience 
is like riding in an easy car through a beauti¬ 
ful valley. Bad conscience is like riding through 
a swamp with every vine a sepant, every tree 
a ‘monster and every breath and sound an 
assailing foe. It is a terrible situation, indeed, 
and it has wrecked many, both physically and 
mentally. 

If the altruistic right hand of men shall 
clasp in good temperance, what is done or 
spoken must be praised. If the actions of men 
are governed by approval, actions that are 
harsh, sordid, brutal, wicked, can find no 
sanction. The habits are productive of evil, 
and this evil is productive of pain. It is there- 


OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 


57 


fore plain that the difference between pain, 
which is the natural ordtr of things maintained 
by the evil; and pleasure, a natural cense- 
quence of the true and the good, is a differ¬ 
ence of conscience; for even if a prize of desire 
is gained, and the means were ostensibly evil, the 
enjoyment of the coveted objective will be very 
limited. So the fate of conduct is the < ffcct of 
good or evil. If it ends in more pain than 
pleasure, it is not very good and does not find 
a great deal in the form of sanction. 

Indeed, the vicissitudes of evil are such as 
to convince us that the true and the good is 
productive of much more happiness than the 
evil. Very little, in the form of true and 
lasting happiness, is possible in the temple of 
wickedness because the two are opposites. It 
cannot be said that evil produces happiness 
unless it may be said that egoistic habits 
and influence produce happiness. Evil may 
covertly influence conduct for a while, but as 
that conduct is totally at variance with the 


OF PJLEASUBE and pain. 


habits of the community it cannot yield much 
happiness for any great period of time unless 
evil influnce oveshadows ethical opinion. 

Morality is a greater source of happiness than 
immorality, for it is always the subject of 
p aise, and is never so injurious to well being 
The one who makes his virtues an end derives 
much more pleasure from morality than the 
one who makes his virtues a means to an end 
because the end is likely^ to be evil or the 
v i tue is likely to cease as soon as the end is 
attained. If the end is good and the means 
are evil the hardened steel of struggle will 
utterly ruin the possibilities of happiness in the 
end. In such a case the presence of more pain 
than pleasure is likely to be the result. Many 
instances there are in which men have delibera¬ 
tely sacrificed pleasure for the simple purpose of 
satisfying revenge, an ambition for wealth, an 
inordinate craving for fame. If pleasure may 
be found in the gain of the prize it is not likely 
that happiness will be so great. 


OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 


59 


It is certain that the actions that are least 
blameable are actions that afford most pleas¬ 
ure. And it is observable that pain flows from 
extremes of conduct, from the exaggerations of 
seif, and the evils of unbalanced activity. Wis¬ 
dom of course, is the sure precuiser of happines, 
for it is the constraining art that unfailingly y ields 


excellent and honorable character and noble 
conduct. It must be a difficult thing to say 
what affords more true happiness than honor¬ 
able character and nobie conduct. Wisdom 
affords more pleaaure than pain, as the chief end 
of conduct, because there is observance of con¬ 
sistency of actions and the proper considera¬ 
tion of ones own pleasure, it is impossible to 
draw a dividing line between wisdom, and the 
conduct that affects others, as well as soli, in a 


definite manner. The good character 
from wisdom is dependent upon the 


that Tows 
character 


that flows from altruism. The nobility of 
actions which we cali wise are not the egui 


th< 


sms 


of self. 


OF PLEASURE and pain. 


(0 


The noble spirit of wisdom reflects the aU 
embracing character of the good in the exercise 
of that judgment which results in general mental 
sanction. The wise pursues its way not in 
accordance with the self embracing sciiish, 
but in accordance with the most natural of 
human feelings,- the feeling of human fellow-, 
ship. This conduct, no matter what the ob¬ 
jective may be, is conduct with reference to the 
opinion and habits of the community. It is 
the connected and dependent conduct of the 
people, embracing the principles and the pre- 
cc t uiti of the community. 

It must be plain, then, that the laudable, 
honorable, conduct of men, with reference to 
the opinion of approval, is productive of more 
pleasure than pain, of more consolation, more 
nobility of mind, because productive of more 
respect from others than the conduct causing 
pain. Tue proper regard of man for man is a 
fine, worthy human inspiration and a great 
source of pleasure, because it enlarges the 


OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 


Cl 

scope of human action and at the same tim 
increases the quality of conduct. It combines 
action in sympathy and fellowship, wherein the 
pure azure cl invigorating pieasuie stimulate., 
consistency of social aetivi ty, 

We may say that like habits and like eu - 
toms of each forms the normal basis of plea.- - 
ure for each, but if there are unwise actions 
there must be pain, and not pleasure, because 
unwise habits and customs create censure, ihe 
sanction of conduct is the sanction ol actions 
that are extensive in quality and quaint y. 
If one so acts as to injure another he is likely 
to find the furies pursuing him instead of himself 
pursuing what is in approval. 

if men conform their actions to greatest rela¬ 
tions, the greatest relations will make out great¬ 
est conditions oi happiness; if they conform 
Umir actions to general designs of conduct main- 
tamed in a community, the greatest good of 
eacn must follow. 

“JSo individual can be happy unless the cir- 


62 


OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 


cumstances of those around him be so adjusted 
as to conspire with his interests.” When there 
is more consideration of each with reference to 
each other, than of each with reference to their 
own exclusive objective, there is more condition 
for more durable happiness than is in an\ r ways 
possible in selfishness. 

In the ver}' exclusion of selfishness there 
must necessarily exist much in the form of 
pain. The condition is then of isolation, and 
it 1 1 at ion is a condition of pain. Pain decrtas- 
<s with the increase of association and amelio- 
ra ion. Fain is lessened with every advance of 
amelioration; and as condition is elevated 
above the more onerous and incongenial, pleas¬ 
ure and agreeableness increase, and, what is 
more, stimulates to what ought to be. 

The very fact of the constancy of improve¬ 
ment in conditions of welfare is the accompa¬ 
nying fact of improvement in habits and mo¬ 
rality, an increase in the substantial sensations, 
satisfactions, tranquility, of the returning 


OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 


63 


pleasantries that enliven and breathe the spirit 
of human happiness. 

So it must appear that the ill conditions of 
men stimulate to activities of betterment ; and 
this pleasing stimulation encourage men to em¬ 
brace those virtues that rise in a susceptible 
heart, that yields an influence of agreeable 
condition, the enforcing powers of which pro¬ 
mote the greatest extent of like disposition, 
sympathy and conduct. These are the relations 
of the true and the good; and the pleasures that 
flow from the relations of the good are greater 
than the pleasures which flow from the artifi¬ 
cial activities of dislikes, prejudice, revenge, 
and the egoisms of self. The favorites of evil 
are favorites and friends of few others,- the 
cause and source of diminution in approval 
and happiness. As the good offers greater pleas¬ 
ure than pain, it is natural to suppose that 
men will, for the most part, endeavor to main¬ 
tain the standards of the society and strive to 
avoid what is injurious, what is of little value, 


04 


OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 


and to avoid the false, the evil, the vicious, of 
untrue statements, of deceit, which always end 
in pain. 

Whatever the means of pleasure employed 
by men, whatever the idols they worship, men 
must know that the sacrifice of good for evil, 
instead of evil for good, results in more pain 
than pleasure. Whatever is noble is respect¬ 
ed by the true and honorable man. What is 
deemed good is held in high estimation. 
The pleasures of life must necessarily be greater, 
in a condition of this sanction, than under the 
condition of less consistency of conduct. It is 
tii i\ fore plain that those elements of mutual 
consideration, veracity, gratitude, respect, are 
the source of more pleasure than pain. Indeed, 
the suffering that may be caused by violating 
trust and faith, dependent upon truth, the great 
pain of smitten conscience, caused by the ill 
conceived regard for a friend, or the ingratitude 
that ill requits kindness, are the sufferings 
teat can find little consolation or happiness 


OF PL.IT A SURE AND PAIN. 


65 


in the dwelling of human hearts. 

As a matter of fact actual good cannot well 

exist where the pleasures of sanction do not 

exist. It may be said that man is bound too 

much bv sanction if his conduct must conform 
* 

to severe considerations, but it must be re¬ 
membered that one is not alone in societ}- ai d 
that proper consideration of others is a con¬ 
sideration of proper conditions of human society 
wherein men are happier than in conditions of 
no consideration and appreciation of conduit. 


CHAPTER X. 


OF POSITIVE SANCTION. 

Reason, the source of sanction, controls 
those actions that meet in general approval; 
and, of course, the actions that result in the 
relations of the society. Conduct is subjected 
to the harmony or custom of action, ana* is 
approved or disapproved, decreed good or evil, 
as human judgment dictates. 

If one but think of the tendency of desires 
to wean men from men, it is plain that reason 
and intelligence will prove the ultimate value of 
any conduct. The pursuit of good is a good 
of good judgment; that of evil of bad judg¬ 
ment. While it is perfectly natural that the 
true and the good be followed rather than the 


OF POSITIVE SANCTION. 


G7 


untrue and the evil, it is due to the intelligence 
of men that the false is avoided and discouraged. 

The pursuit of good is the. pursuit of sanc¬ 
tion, and the pursuit of sanction is a positive 
subject of reason If conduct is consistent and 
conformable to sanction, that conduct is meas¬ 
ured by the expediency and custom of the sanc¬ 
tion. Conduct is adjusted to conduct; and 
reason is the medium. Conduct is approved 
because it is in line with the perceived habits 
of each. It is neither the conduct of impulse 
nor the growth of forms. It is distinctly the 
conduct of rational sanction. 

Is it not plain that, in the best sense of the 
word, good results from moral standards created 
by the recognition of those relations which men 
accept as promotive of good. And as good 
men come to learn that the conduct of each is 
desirable and agreeable, is it not most enforcing 
that defects in any must be ruled out of 
order. If men are so callous in reason as not 
to realize the values of sanction; what may be 


68 


OB' posrTiVi-: sanction. 


said of hun an kind but that the race of men 
runs contrary to a divine gift? 

Reason is the source of sanction, and its 
noble quality is displayed in the quality of 
the sanction. It is observed in the qualifica¬ 
tions of forbearance; which may include sympa¬ 
thy; of deterrence, which may include grati¬ 
tude; of praise and blame, which may include 
wisdom; of approval, which may include the 
true and the good. 

The right means that conduct of men which 
admits of the greatest relations of men, and 
necesrarily includes wisdom and good judgment 
in praising and blaming acts of approval in the 
accord of good and the true in sympathy and 
gratitude. General sanction is in accord with 
g» ru rai jut gnu nt; in aceoi d with the sympatheis 
and course of approval pnrsued, with the ex¬ 
cellence pervading the society. The Lacedae- 
nunians thought it much worthier that their 
e dely men rather be seen in places instructing 
youths in wisdom and noble conduct than 


OF POSITIVE SANCTION. 


69 


in devoting themselves to advantages of self; a 
very different view of our times which turns 
age and experience out of most all service, and 
leaves youth and inexperience without the sound 
guide of valuable influnce, and the operation of 
positive sanction. 

The community that creates a general stan¬ 
dard of conduct looks to the standards main¬ 
tained, and as these are conceived to be pro¬ 
motive of highest ultimate ends, we do well 
in making our cuurse adhere to the course 
that attains the most excellent ends. One 
may argue with himself that certain confor¬ 
mation of acts will serve an occasion, but if 
the conduct does not conform to certain stand¬ 
ards. there is not sufficient grounds (or sanction. 

It is plain that such means create a duty, 
more or less positive, on account of expectation, 
on the part of each, to act as others act under 
like circumstances and conditions. The course 
of action pursued creates that expe<*ation 
which men observe as the usual results under 


70 


OF POSITIVE SANCTION. 


like circumstances. That which all create for 
the sake of all, no one can violate for the 
sake of self. The expectation is of each and all 

and not of each to himself. The duty is a 

% 

duty of each to act like each should act under 
given circumstances; and the expectation rests 
upon this hypothesis. It is theiefore a duty 
enforced by the approval and disapproval of 
the members of society. 

So one who acknowledges the community as 
his habitation, founds his mental conceptions 
and observations upon what ho accepts as the 
prescribed standards of human conduct enfor¬ 
ced by the prescribed standards of the com¬ 
munity. He accepts that morality, as a member 
of the community, because it is suited to it; 
the morality that rests upon those precedents 
which flow from the habits that make the 
customs of conduct, the violation of which 
is a palpable breach of duty; and an indisputa¬ 
ble wrong. When one ol serves what is deem¬ 
ed the general standard of conduct prevailing 


OF POSITIVE SANCTION. 


71 


in a community, be will very likely observe 
what is in particular the right course for him 
to pursue. His habits, his customs, and his 
actions, will, for the most part, be the habits, 
the customs, the actions, pursued by the peo¬ 
ple of the community. It is a case of con¬ 
duct prescribed by the conduct of each other; 
and expectations are fulfilled by conformation. 

Existing a moral creature amidst moral beings 
the rational creature feels the duty of consistent 
conduct. Such a nature imposes the duty of 
right against wrong. The duty of following 
virtue becomes almost imperative; for it accords 
with the moral nature of the society, causing 
pain to others, in transgressions, and pleasure in 
adherence. Indeed, it is so much a matter of 
duty that the happiness of the pursuit yields 
the most delightful and lasting of enjoyments. 

The fact of the matter is these duties, in a 
weli established society, are practically obliga¬ 
tions. They are obligations because they create 
expectations on the part, of all to the effect tha^ 


72 


OF POSITIVE SANCTION. 


all will act according to generally approved 
conduct. 

All virtuous men love the true and the good, 
and follow that conduct usually deemed 
honorable and excellent. The most consistent 
course of conduct is the integrity of human vo¬ 
lition. When the will is made the subject of 
moral reasoning conduct is likely to be virtuous. 
Nothing else is more positive than that excel- 
ence of conduct fully endowed with moral reas¬ 
oning. 

But some men find that prevailing habits 
and customs are sometimes in conflict with 
their particular interests; they find their Int¬ 
erests in conflict with their morality, and they 
usually make short decisions trampling under 
foot the principles and standards that they 
do not find convenient to heed. But it is the 
object and purpose of general standards of con¬ 
duct to keep alive a keen and vigorous sense 
of right and wrong; a live conscience, ready, 
willing to meet irregularities; and any evil 


OF POSITIVE SANCTION. 


73 


conduct. It is this standard that makes out 
the regulating influence of conscience. It is 
then that we may say that conscience proves 
the possibilities of great adherence to the sense 
of right. Conscience becomes the virtue that 
points out the worthy course of conduct when 
tiie atmosphere of sanction is normal and 
healthy; and any community or society failing 
to maintain this condition must come 1o real¬ 
ize that its foundations of morality are weak¬ 
ened. This virtue is the only means of main¬ 
taining a healthy sense of morality, of what 
is best, of what is expedient, what is conform¬ 
ing with general standards, what is productive 
of most good, most general happiness. 


CHAPTER XI. 


METHODS OF SANCTION. 

We may say that those habits which come 
to be marked out in the relations of men, 
come to form standards of communion with 
each other, forms the defined manner of action 
within the community. 

It is difficult to judge mere intentions; it is 
certainly dangerous to leave the actions of men 
to the motives of men. It is much worse to leave 
introspection to its own conclusions. It is by 
all means best, with reference to men, that 
conduct be referred to the court of public 
sanction. However well the actor means, he 
necessarily contravenes the moral standards of 
the community in the conduct which it censures 
and blames. 


METHODS OF SANCTION. 


75 


So, very plainly, it is reasonable to sup¬ 
pose that in rational society men will use more 
reason than instinct; that they will consider 
what is expedient and inexpedient in conduct, 
and pay due attention to what is regarded as 
good or evil. 

It is a matter of reason and reasoning, not 
the comparing of individual forces for cumbat 
and contest. That accord of reason which 
results in accord of will, is the result of reason 
in mutual accord of wills, and not a matter of 
contest and struggle. Communication of will 
is a matter of reason 

So it is to be expected, that, in a sound con¬ 
dition of human society, there may be found 
more than animal condition; for there may be 
found the tendency of each to consider the 
ideas and actions of each that the conduct of 
all may be accommodated to a feasible and prac¬ 
ticable standard. 

It is the unity of reason in judgments of 
actions, the sympathy of sentiments in the 


76 


METHODS OF SANCTION. 


harmony of habits. 

The reference of conduct to the genera] 
standard of action maintained may be by the 
process of induction - deduction- of reasoning 
from the general to the particular, or in more 
expeditious instances, in the immediate appre¬ 
hension of the prevailing rules and precedents 
of conduct and prompt decision on what should 
or not be done. This is the intuitive, not 
from any immediate sense of the right and the 
wrong, but the prompt recognition of actions 
deemed right and wrong, and prompt applica. 
tion of them to the present requirements. We 
decide upon the course we should pursue by 
the preper process of reason with reference to 
sanction, to the one judging as well as the 
one judged. 

It is plain that men have by such means 
the safest means of complex relations. T hey 
are enabled to apply the general to the particular 
and the particular to the general, in doubtful 
and complex instances. 


METHODS OF SANCTION. 


77 


In immediate intuition that judgment is con¬ 
sistent which accords in agreement with the 
general standard of conduct, wherein the very 
action, in every step, reveales the will in im¬ 
mediate applicatioa of facts to existing circum¬ 
stances. By reason, indeed, the activities of 
each are made to correspond with the activities 
of each other. It is then that wisdom exhibits 
its arts; for then it is that conduct is to an 
end including the conduct of all according to a 
regular standard. 

The judgment may be either spontaneous or 
deferred. Sometimes it is deferred as a mat¬ 
ter of prudence. The circumstances may be 
such as to make postponement of action or the 
decision for action a very desirable thing. And 
it may be the case that time may be required 
for the calculation and deliberation of condi¬ 
tions and circumstances. In such cases action 
upon the moment must prove very detrimental. 
The particulars of interests and facts and 
the weighing of these with reference to gener- 


78 


METHODS OE SANCTION. 


al rules of sanction are matters of deliberation 
and calculation. The measuring of deference 
and concurrence may be a matter requiring a 
course different from the course which intuition 
dictates. Sometimes it is difficult to say what is 
the proper course, whether the one or the other; 
whether the one or the other, it ought to be 

9 

sanctionable. 

Some communities, as well as individuals, on 
account of peculiarities of condition, enforce the 
necssity of peculiar considerations; their course 
of action is from a point of view somewhat 
variable, and, in consequence, require variable 
considerations and conciliations. The process 
of conclusion is simply a matter of circumstan¬ 
ces. 

And in conformation of ones course it may be 
the case that introspection proves of no small 
value. It must be conceded that mistaken 
conduct, with reference to pesonal actions, 
may be largely corrected when one thinks it over 
with himself. Yet he is thinking of compara- 


METHODS OF SANCTION. 


70 


live action and the obligations of virtue. 

In any event the method of decision is simp¬ 
ly means to ends. The time, the nature of 
the matter, the circumstances, may all conspire 
to make out a logical case of precedent ; and 
the future, the past, the present, will find in 
the communion of conduct the procedure of 
moral forces. 


CHAPTER XII. 


OF THE ALTRUISTIC. 

That consideration of conduct which refer 
actions to consideration of others instead of to 
absolute consideration of self, may be termed 
the altruistic principle because the mode that 
admits of humane considerations of man 
for man, of respect for the material welfare of 
the members of society, of regard for the mor¬ 
al welfare of the society; in fact, the altruistic 
is an ethical principle because it looks to the 
happiness of others through such modes. 

If happiness be regarded as springing from 
proper relations of life; what may be said 
of that conduct which tends to promote the 
conditions of relations. May we not say that 


OF THE ALTRUISTIC. 


SI 


men act on moral principles when they act in 
personal consideration of others, respecting 
their material condition, their good, their hap¬ 
piness, since these elements are the very foun¬ 
dation of sanction. 

The humane spirit of sanction will always 
oppose the inhuman spirit of human misery. It 
will endeavor to improve the conditions of 
human existence as the best expression of hu¬ 
man sanction. It will make conduct conform (o 
the existing notions of society as means of human 
happiness. It will seek happiness in this very 
logical condition and not that of absolute self. 

The judgments of the altruisic are judg" 
ments in the prudence and wisdom of the ac:: 
even when ones own interests are concerned. 
Indeed, those who are given to the determina¬ 
tion of actions from motives-of pleasure through 
the sanction of others could hardly be called 
egoistic. They are aitruistic because they are 
considerate of others not in gaining undue 
advantages over them but in the advantage 
and happiness ol all. 


82 


OF THi: ALTRUISTIC. 


This, of course, means the best good ol all 
an i not of a few. What is ga'ned in pleasure, 
through the best good of all, is far more sanc- 
tionable than what is gained in pleasure as the 
best good of the few. The theory that the b st 
good o? the few effects the best good of all 
cannot be fitted with the theory that the best 
is synonymous with social sanction. Socity is a 
matter of approval, and if actions are of a 
nature selfish, censure will flood them with 
its dbapproval, and enforce its will in general 
sand on. 

The pleasures of the smaller circle, within a 
la-gel* circle of human beings, subject to toil and 
tumble, is just about as sanctionable as war in 
a society of gentlemen. While this smaller circle 
may have its idols and beliefs, it is never certain 
\.hich way these may sway their actions. They 
may dictate actions so abhorrent to the people 
as to require bayonets be held in the faces of 
what is termed “the mothh 

The altruistic exists only when the sanction 


OF THE ALTRUISTIC. 


83 


of conduct extends to general approval. There 
must, in any normal condition of society, exist 
more pleasure in sanction than in selfishness 
because the pleasures of the few cannot prove 
the pleasures of the society. 

The forbearing and concurring spirit of the 
altruistic is the fact of good in itself. The 
fact of good in itself is the fact of good 
through each and all. The altruistic spirit can 
not exist other than in the good of society. 
It cannot possibly exist in gratuities, becau .e 
gratuities in altruism is an inconsistent pr .>po¬ 
stton. The altruistic is necessarily good, and the 
means cannot be evil, if the means and ends 
are good how is it possible to say that evils 
exist? It is more consistent to say that the 
conduct which men will usually approve refers 
to the good of all. 

And although self is a consideration in this 
reference, yet it is an extension of a virtue 
and not a vice. It is, indeed, a reference of self 
to a principle that benefits all. The individual 


81 


OF THE ALTRUISTIC. 


docs not consider his own ultimate end as the 
exclusive consideration of relations. He rather 
considers the reference of self as means to a 
general common good. With reference to 
others, altruistic conduct is the balance of self 
with others; is the looking to the greatest good 
oi seif through otheis,- the merits and true 
aspect of society. 

Let the desires be what they may, it is cer- 
lain that altruistic men will subordinate the 
wrong for the sake of the right. Deviation 
from the right overlooks the future. The good 
of the future is iost in the present. Opulence, 
power, position, happiness, may be secured in a 
way, but it must be self evident that if these 
pursuits are acquired at the expense of the fu¬ 
ture they are more egoistic than altiuistie, 
because lacking in the spirit of the good and the 
honorable. The balance of reason which pu- 
mits no one to regard himself of more impor¬ 
tance than others will not sanction condut, 
either in politics, government, or industry, 


OF THE ALTRUISTIC. 


85 


which sacrifice the good and the honorable. 
Indeed, the society should be altuistie enough 
to take care of itself, and when its govenment 
turns against it, that government should be 
ousted from power. 

‘'That which is ethically best- what we call 
goodness or virtue- involves a course oi conduct 
which, in all respects, is opposed to that which 
leads to success in the cosmic struggle for exui. 
ence. In place of ruthless self assertion, it de¬ 
mands seif restraint; in place of thrusting aside 
or treading down, it requires that the individ¬ 
ual shall not merely respect, but shall help his 
fellows. Its influence is directed not so much 
to the survival of the fittest as to the fitting as 
many as possible to survival. It repudiates the 
glaaiatuiiai theory of existence; and demand > 
that each man who enters into the enjoyment 
oi the advantages of a polity shail be mindful of 
ids debt to those who have laboriously construc¬ 
ted it” No human conduct can be more in 
accord with past, present and future association 
loan the altruistic. 


86 


OF THE ALTRUISTIC. 


The fact of society is the fact of human 
relations wherein human conduct is a viinl el¬ 
ement of valuable consideration. If the rela¬ 
tions shall be extensive conduct must not be 
antagonistic. It must be altruistic. The altru¬ 
istic, combining the good with relations, avoids 
the evils that result in discord. Greed gives 
way to kindness; inhumanity yields to the great 
spirit of humanity. There is more in this than in 
that. There are far more more benefits in the 
excellencies of honesty than dishonesty, for the 
one who appropriates anothers ideas or effects, 
discounts the moral and material value oT his 
woth to the society. The one who tells a false¬ 
hood publishes his own estimation of himself. 
The bribing egoist, seeking an advantage over 
others, through public officials, is one who 
thinks mone of his own narrow realm than 
the larger realm of others. And the public official 
who appropriates the duties and functions of 
government to merely satisfy iiis own whims or 
the prejudices of political party marks himself 


OF THE ALTRUISTIC. 


87 


as typically egoistic in manner. 

So it may be concluded the altruistie ad¬ 
vance the elements of social relations- virtue, 
honor, integrity, the good. The element? of 
human relations are promoted and made to 
guide men safely along the paths of life free 
of the difficulties and obstacles of the ego-stic. 


CHAPTER XIII. 


OF THE EGOISTIC. 

It is observed that actions are most consis¬ 
tent when accommodated to each other because 
the actual means of social existence. Approval 
is of habits and actions deemed good as rr\eans 
of greatest ultimate good and happiness of the 
members of society. 

It follows, then, that society refers not to 
primary considerations of self; which is the 
idoi of the egoist, but plainly to that accom¬ 
modation of each which is association in general 
approval and approbation. 

And while it may be true that some societies 
may vary as to means and ideas of relations, and 
get along well enough with the egoistic, yet it 


OF THE EGOISTIC. 


89 


must be owned, both in principle and empirical 
evidence, that the egoistic is m t y of conduct 
inconducive to social relations. 

As a matter of fact the egoistic is the l are 
man of nature, without any of the admirable 
adornments of society, a rough and rude crea¬ 
ture, shorn of the beauties of society, like the 
bird of paradise, plucked of the beautiful plu¬ 
mage of truth, virtue, the good, the respect of 
man as a human creature. The egoistic is 
either this or the same thing with artificial 
plumage assumed to deceive. 

it needs no great argument to convince 
that the egoist is the ugliest animal in the 
society of men He will cultivate the sentiments 
of sanction with assumed colors, likeNapol on, 
who adopted the habits and customs of the 
Egyptians, that he may easily vanquish them. 
He will go abroad in the society of men and 
leave a wake of disapproval every where he 
goes. It is therefore the most harmful thing 
in the world to say that the egoistic is consis- 


90 


OF THE EGOISTIC. 


\ 


tent, or congenial, in true social life. Taking 
the. past as evidence, it is observed that most 
all the great calamities of the ages are due to 
the untamed selfishness of men. Taking the 
present, we observe the pernicious activities of 
the egoistic as conspicuously as when we read 
ancient history. This age is no better than the 
pagan age. In consequence it is a safe conject¬ 
ure that the future will, in the main, lead 
to the idol, self, and not to the shrine of the 
altruistic. 

The egoist either does not read history, or he 
does not heed what he reads. If he does heed it 
the results are worse than if he did not, for he ad¬ 
vance; its selfishness as justifeation of his course. 
The egoistic is mostly of the present, for it looks 
to the promotion of the egoisms of self with¬ 
out refeionce to the welfare of others or effects 
upon the future. It is by no means universal. 
It does not contemplate the greatest good of the 
greatest number. It does not contemplate the 
idea of happiness as implied in society. 


OF THE EGOISTIC. 


91 


The activities devoted so extensively to the 
considerations of self are indubiously wrong 
because they always run against sanction. The 
greater measure of sanction resides in the 
altruistic utility of the individual. We have 
in the ethical principle of the egoistic exactly 
what is individualism,- the survival of the 
inethical, in the monoply of human conduct. 

Since society consist of relations of men in 
general sanction, it must appear plain enough 
that if the egoistic acts to the contrary he 
is with no support of sanction. What can be 
further from sanction than that which moves 
away from the communication of approval? It 
is not possible to say that the selfish spirit of 
egoism is freely communicable. Is it not plain 
that the increase of approal must cease with 
the decrease of the altruistic? The difference 
between pain, which is the natural order of 
things maintained by the egoistic and epicurean 
habits of men, and the true social ord( r of 
men, which is the altruistic order of things, is 


92 


OF THE EGOISTIC. 


a differ once of that regard of man for man which 
means the best good and happiness produced by 
the relations of all. The habits of the egoistic 
are productive of evil to many because the 
effects produce pain for most and pleasure for 
the few. The conduct that is full of sordidness 
and avarice is characteristic of the egoistic, and 
makes it very difficult to appreciate. Few will ap¬ 
preciate it; more will condemn it. There is, in 
consequence, less in the form ef the good when 
the egoistic prevails than when the altruistic 
prevails. So the egoistic diminish the good while 
the altruistic increase it; the egoistic condemns 
the relations of men while the altruistic cen¬ 
sures for sake of relations. The logical condi¬ 
tion of true social life is agreeable, but win n 
happiness is diminished the normality is dis- 
tubed. When arts are exclusive sanction con¬ 
demns; when place and fortune are monopolized 
sanction thinks of dangers. It is hardly con¬ 
ceivable that one who sacrifice momentary 
pleasures for sake of projecting his aims will 


OF THE EGOISTIC. 


93 


regard with favor the ethical standards of the 
society. Herein exists no desire for praise, no 
sense of shame, no feeling of pain. Destitute 
or the sympathies of sanction the egoist links his 
destiny to the fickleness of his own actions, 
and violates mutual trust. Whether current or 
ultimate, the egoistic is without the scope of 


legitimate sanction. 

The egoistic, then, in not of proper social 
quality to guide the destinies of a peeple. If 
we consider what ought to be, in the society 
of men, we will not say that the egoistic offers 
the best hopes of human happiness. If we con¬ 
sider that the sanction of men is to facilitate 
the relations of men, and that the relations of 
men are to lift them out of the harsh condi¬ 
tions of nature, it must appear sufficiently 
clear that the conduct which ought always pre¬ 
vail in society is the sanctionable conduct of 


altruistic men. 

Let it be maintained among men that the 
sanction of each shall govern each and moral 


94 


OF THE EGOISTIC. 


conduct will help the future to be what it 
should, not vicious, not struggling to maintain 
an unnatural condition, not diminishing 
means to ends. So we may say that is right 
which does not conflict with sanction, even 
though it yields no pleasure; not any more so 
than any other conduct, but because affording 
a communion of right, without detriment to 
any, w:-th approval to all. It is therefore a 
very commendable thing to say that when we 
are altruisic we are virtuous and when we are 
egoistic we are evil, since virtue is the commu- 
ion of the good, the quality of actions deemed 
just and honorable, and therefore in acccdance 
with right, which effects the best good of all. 

Let it be maintained among men that each 
review the conduct of each, and the conference 
of interpretation by intelligent men must 
centure the egoistic and always promote the 
altruistic. The altruistic accelerates and pro¬ 
motes the perfect sanction. It makes out a 
consensus of opinion upon the future that must 


OF THE EGOISTIC. 


95 


come to enforce a high standard of conduct, 
a fit field for a true standard of action and a 
record of excellent activity. 

If the means of human conduct consist of 
self alone that conduct can in no manner be re¬ 
garded as productive of ultimate good. The 
ultimate good is a product of harmony ia 
the actions of men. The whole array of noble 
actions, of the wise, the moral, the right, join 
in that concord of activity which is effective in 
the promotion of the agreeable and the good. 


CHAPTER XIV. 

OF PERFECTIONISM. 

The fact of early conduct was the fact 
mostly of actions given to struggle between 
tribes. As men settled in more varied activ¬ 
ities, habits and customs facilitated and ad¬ 
vanced relations. 

This means that men have approved actions 
which completely harmonize the activities of in¬ 
dividuals. Every action inimical to this activity 
is discouraged. Every act in conflict with the 
possibilities of relations usually finds disappro¬ 
val. In fact, the more rational creatures taste 
of the alluring fruits of sanction the more they 
strive to advance the relations of men. Tbe 
elements of truth, justice, honor, virtue, arc cul¬ 
tivated to improve the standard of relations. 


OF PERFECTIONISM. 


9 7 


No great morality, no great enlightenment, 
no great human elevation, in achievement, are 
possible without this general standard, of hu¬ 
man conduct. Harmonious in agreement ; sym¬ 
pathetic and peaceful, ethical men arc united 
in rational actions and standards, wherein 
each individual stands forth a perfect type in the 
coordinatitn of human activity. Then it is that 
men appreciate each other most and give to 
each the consideration of honor and virtue. 

Hence we observe in human conduct the 
trace of a very exalted order of things, mani¬ 
festing an excellence that could hardly be tra¬ 
ceable to the spirit of selfishness, evil, tbe 
false, the foolish, the immoral. The order in 
which we observe the commendable activities of 
wisdom, the good, the moral, is the conduct in 
which men find a great deal of the altruistic. No 
one finds less pleasure than another; and pain 
is the result uf transgression. 

So hence it is that the more men are in har¬ 
mony of conduct the more virtuous they are 


98 


OF PERFECTIONISM. 


and the happier, the more honorable, they art, 
because admitting of the greatest extent ot the 
sanctionable. The reveied conduct of the greatest 
sanction is the profound conduct which we are 
pleased to term the altruistic', for as this is 
always right, men are in most accord with what 
follows, thus maintaining the most faithfuj 
adherence of man to man. 

This creature, perfect in the dignities of a 
rational being, gives evidences of his wisdom 
by the evidence of his perfect sanction, which 
unites men in a noble standard of relations As 
we come to realize that this sanction is the 
part of excellence, it is plain that the influ¬ 
ence of excellence in conduct must be very 
extensive. And if we are thus convinced by 
the excellencies of such persuasive forces, could 
we deny the great benefits of the perfection of 
human conduct. 

And is not such as this most consistent since 
the activies that are deemed perfect in them¬ 
selves. As excellence is thus made to embrace 


OF PERFECTIONISM. 


99 


the virtues, what can be more effective in the 
attainment and maintenance of perfection in 
human conduct. 

The perfect man is a product of a perfect con¬ 
dition of sanction, of the ethical. As the 
greatest sanction flows from sympathies of 
feeling, and the sympathy of feeling is most 
wide and extensive in that which yields iLe 
most lasting and enduring pleasures, we are 
aided in the sanction of conduct bv the exam- 
pie of this altruistic course. The example of 
the altruistic is effective because conduct rear¬ 
ed in virtue and cultivated in the noble, the good. 
The beginning of the perfect man is in virtue, 
tne perfection, in the altruistic; for in the altru¬ 
istic exist the spirit that embrace each and all, 
and virtue affords the pleasure of welcome. 
It is not repulsive and never repells. 

The perfect man is a gentleman amongst gen¬ 
tlemen bcause no one usually thinks of himself 
so much as to forget others. The perfect man 
is honorable because he is manifestly not so sel- 


100 


OF PERFECTIONISM. 


fish as to will a dishonorable act, and, besides, 
he is surrounded by actions that do not mislead 
him. The perfect man is prudent and wise for 
the wisdom of conduct is the altruistic nature 
The perfect man is a social creature, for he 
embraces all the elements of social sanction 
and stands forth a great examplar. 

What is more glorious than a perfect man? 
Napoleon Bonaparte made himself great, but 
he crushed under his iron heel every principle 
of the sanctionable; he held over humanity 
t he sword of destruction and complained of the 
enormous difference in the approval achieved 
by the sword and by sanction. Caesar, famed 
in arms, could not hold in gratitude the man 
he would enlist in his casue, and instead of 
finding sanction found a dagger. But although 
the brutalities of the egoistic we still have; 

what majr be said of the altruistic that gave 

% 

up a perfect life for the attraction of mankind 
to the excellencies and greatness of the noble 
and the good. 


OF PERFECTIONISM. 


101 


What can dedicate man to honor and sanc¬ 
tion more sincerly, more thoroughly, than the 
route of human life that views the panoply of 
the egoistic and then turns away to face the 
altruistic, with the way strewn with pleasan¬ 
tries and the end unfolding into a great scene 
of happiness, the sunset of life, bat hed in golden 
sunshine. 




































' 






































































































■ 




Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 

PreservationTechnoloqies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

111 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724) 779-2111 











































